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Abstract: This article offers a normative analysis of some of the most controversial incidents 
involving police—what I call police-generated killings. In these cases, bad police tactics create a 
situation where deadly force becomes necessary, becomes perceived as necessary, or occurs 
unintentionally. Police deserve blame for such killings because they choose tactics that 
unnecessarily raise the risk of deadly force, thus violating their obligation to prioritize the 
protection of life. Since current law in the United States fails to ban many bad tactics, police-
generated killings often are treated as “lawful but awful.” To address these killings, some call on 
changes to departmental policies or voluntary reparations by local governments, yet such 
measures leave in place a troubling gap between ethics and law. I argue that police-generated 
killings merit legal sanctions by appealing to a relevant analogy: self-generated self-defense, 
where the person who engages in self-defense started the trouble. The persistent lack of 
accountability for police-generated killings threatens life, police legitimacy, and trust in 
democratic institutions. The article closes by identifying tools in law and policy to address this 
challenge. 
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Police kill over a thousand individuals each year in the United States (Fagan and Campbell 
2020). Because video evidence and key details are missing for many of these killings, it is 
impossible to know exactly how many are justified. But some clearly are not. Consider the 2015 
shooting of Walter Scott in South Carolina. Video shows Officer Michael Slager shooting a 
plainly unarmed Scott in the back as he fled a traffic stop (New York Times 2015). Slager’s 
actions provoke a combination of moral disgust, anger, and horror—and rightly so. At the time 
he was shot, Scott presented no threat to anyone’s life. There was no need to use deadly force to 
protect life, yet the officer shot anyway. In this case, the law backs up our ethical intuitions. US 
law prohibits police from shooting nondangerous suspects who flee (Tennessee v. Garner 1985).  
 The law, though, does not always match our intuitions regarding killings by police. That 
is especially true for some of the most controversial incidents, what I call police-generated 
killings. In these cases, bad police tactics create a situation where deadly force becomes 
necessary, becomes perceived as necessary, or occurs unintentionally. Since current law in the 
US fails to ban many bad tactics, police-generated killings often are treated as “lawful but awful” 
(Cournoyer 2016). Several high-profile incidents fall into this category, like the 2014 shooting in 
Cleveland, Ohio, of Tamir Rice—a 12-year-old Black child. An officer shot Rice after 
perceiving him make a threatening movement with a gun that turned out to be fake. The shooting 
occurred after the officer confronted Rice at close range with his firearm drawn. This abrupt 
escalation of force appears unnecessary, since Rice presented no immediate threat (Park and 
Lindsay 2015). In fact, many use-of-force experts criticized police tactics in this case and blamed 
them for contributing to a likely avoidable death (Pickering and Klinger 2016, 28; Kindy 2016).  
Defenders of police responsible for such incidents argue that deadly force was and should 
be lawful, since at the moment of its use officers had a reasonable belief in its necessity to stop a 
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threat to life (Holloway 2015). In the US, some legal precedents support this view, which is why 
officers like the one who shot Rice often avoid sanctions (Williams and Smith 2015). Yet as 
protests in recent years make clear, many find that lack of accountability deeply troubling. 
Given such concerns, this article offers a normative analysis of police-generated killings. 
Sometimes these killings stem from violations of departmental policy by individual officers. But 
the problem goes far deeper than a few “bad apples.” Police training and policy often entrench 
bad tactics, due to police administrators’ resistance to reforms that prioritize the protection of 
life. Police-generated killings highlight failures at both the individual and institutional level. In 
these incidents, police choose tactics that unnecessarily raise the risk of deadly force, thus 
violating their professional obligation to prioritize the protection of life. Beyond deserving moral 
blame, police-generated killings also merit legal sanctions. I make this case by appealing to a 
relevant analogy: self-generated self-defense, where the person who engages in self-defense 
started the trouble (Leverick 2006, 109–29).  
 My analysis suggests greater emphasis on ensuring that lawful but awful killings by 
police no longer are lawful. In the debate over policing post-Ferguson, there often has been 
reluctance to pursue this approach.1 Even among those recognizing the need to change police 
practices, much of the focus has been on reforms that can be enacted without changes to law, like 
revised departmental policies by police administrators (Police Executive Research Forum 2016; 
Zimring 2017; Mummolo 2018b) and reparations to victims paid by municipalities (Page 2019). 
Though these proposals have merit, by themselves they remain deeply inadequate. Unless the 
law mandates it, many police departments continue to teach bad tactics and questionable killings 
continue (Gilbert 2017). And when such killings occur, the law often proves impotent to ensure 
																																																								
1 Garrett and Stoughton (2017) and Stoughton (2021) are exceptions. 
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meaningful accountability, which further erodes trust in government—especially among those 
most harmed like Black Americans (Weitzer 2002; Jones 2020).  
So there are compelling reasons to address tactics and laws that lead to police-generated 
killings, given their threats to life and government legitimacy. Mass protests in 2020 after the 
police killings of Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and other Black lives spurred passage of 
legislation prohibiting some tactics linked to police-generated killings (Jones and Mendieta 2021, 
2). In light of these new political opportunities, the article closes by outlining tools available to 
democratic institutions to close the gap between ethics and law regarding police deadly force.  
 
The Priority of Protecting Life 
The principle guiding my analysis is that, in their jobs, police have an ethical obligation to 
prioritize the protection of life. This idea enjoys broad acceptance, including in law enforcement, 
as evident from use-of-force policies. The US Department of Justice (1995) emphasizes “the 
integrity and paramount value of all human life.” Likewise, a consensus use-of-force policy by 
various US law enforcement organizations states that its overarching goal is to “value and 
preserve human life” (Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies et al. 2020, 2).  
 The idea that officers have an ethical obligation, tied to their professional role, to 
prioritize the protection of life aligns with common intuitions about police work. When an 
elusive suspect flees but poses no threat to life, it is wrong for police to use deadly force to stop 
them. Such force is a disproportionate response, since preserving the suspect’s life trumps the 
government’s interest in catching them. Similarly, if police must choose between catching a thief 
escaping with stolen goods or saving a bystander from a deadly trap planted by the thief, they 
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should save the bystander. Though police have a responsibility to enforce laws against property 
theft, the value of life exceeds any piece of property, and thus protecting life takes priority.  
 A commitment to protecting life also entails working to prevent serious bodily injury and 
rape, not just deadly threats. The irrevocable nature of these harms explains why stopping them 
takes priority over, say, preventing property loss. When a car is stolen it can be replaced, but it is 
impossible to restore a life taken or limb lost. Perhaps some property, like rare art, can never be 
replaced. Still, most without hesitation favor saving a life over rare art because of the former’s 
incomparable value (Rodin 2002, 43–48). This core value informs normative expectations for a 
wide range of human activity, and police work is no exception.  
Police sometimes encounter threats that preclude the possibility of protecting every life, 
which complicate their obligation to prioritize the protection of life. These situations force police 
to prioritize certain lives over others. Such dilemmas are always regrettable, but in some cases 
our moral intuitions are clear on what choice police should make. If a hostage taker is about to 
kill their hostage and only one option will stop the threat—shooting the hostage taker—a police 
sniper should take the shot. Saving the hostage is morally preferable to saving the hostage taker 
because of the latter’s unjust threat. When police prioritize which lives to save, the lives of those 
who unjustly threaten others receive lower priority. That point by no means implies that the lives 
of suspected criminals lack value. Outside zero-sum scenarios, police should strive to protect the 
lives of suspects and bring them into custody without harm. 
As these examples suggest, the obligation to prioritize the protection of life has 
implications for police tactics. Here is the most obvious implication: 
Obligation to Choose Nonlethal Tactics: Police have an ethical obligation to use 
nonlethal tactics, unless deadly force is necessary to stop an unjust threat to life.  
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This obligation provides officers with valuable guidance and prohibits a range of actions, like 
shooting a thief just because they are elusive and might get away.  
But though valuable, such guidance is limited. Officers often have various nonlethal 
tactics available, and the above obligation offers little guidance on which to choose. Officers’ 
general obligation to prioritize the protection of life has implications for those decisions. It 
specifically requires police to favor nonlethal tactics known to reduce the risk of deadly force, 
since they are most consistent with the goal of protecting life. We can express this principle as 
follows:  
Obligation to Reduce the Risk of Deadly Force: If there is no threat to life requiring 
deadly force and nonlethal tactic X is available to police, known to reduce the risk of 
deadly force compared to other tactics, and generally as effective in enforcing the law as 
other tactics, then police have an ethical obligation to choose X.  
 
This principle shows how a commitment to protecting life influences earlier stages of police 
work, not just split-second decisions on whether to shoot. Police have an obligation to choose 
nonlethal tactics that avoid needlessly creating situations that make deadly force more likely.2 
 Importantly, this obligation concerns reducing the risk for all parties in an interaction. 
Tactics that raise the risk of deadly force for suspects often raise that same risk for officers. If a 
likely armed suspect is not an imminent threat and an officer confronts them at close range, such 
action makes escalation of force more likely and puts both in greater danger. There is little 
margin for error, as any false move or misperception can precipitate deadly force (Pickering and 
Klinger 2016, 27–28). In comparison, use of distance and cover by police during the interaction 
(when feasible) represents a Pareto improvement: it reduces the risk of deadly force for one or 
																																																								
2 This point aligns with Jake Monaghan’s (2017, 220) claim that officers have “a more stringent obligation against 
killing.” Though empowered to use deadly force, police have an obligation to take extra precautions to avoid 
needing it. 
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more parties without raising that risk for others. Such Pareto improvements are what the 
obligation to reduce the risk of deadly force most clearly requires.  
This obligation places an additional but modest constraint on law enforcement. It only 
requires police to choose the less risky tactic when it is generally as effective in enforcing the 
law as other nonlethal options. That caveat is important. Without it, an obligation to reduce the 
risk of deadly force could imply that police can do little to enforce the law. Many law 
enforcement measures raise the risk of deadly force, even if just slightly. Consider traffic stops. 
Though only a small portion of traffic stops end in deadly force, they increase that risk. If police 
had to abandon this and all other tactics raising the risk of deadly force, no matter how small, 
they would lack many tools to enforce the law and be less effective in achieving that goal. Such a 
requirement would be overly restrictive, which the above obligation avoids.  
Now police can have an obligation to choose a tactic generally as effective as a more 
risky option, but perhaps marginally less effective. Consider how police conduct searches and 
serve warrants. A common justification for no-knock raids is preventing the destruction of 
evidence, especially drugs (Richards v. Wisconsin 1997). For this reason, no-knock raids may be 
marginally more effective in enforcing the law than knocking, announcing, and waiting 15–30 
seconds before entering. Yet preventing the small amount of evidence that can be destroyed 
during a standard warrant’s short waiting period pales in comparison to avoiding the deadly risks 
inherent in no-knock raids (see next section for discussion of those risks).  
Discontent with policing today partly stems from concerns—voiced by protest 
movements like Black Lives Matter (see Lebron 2017)—that officers enforce the law without 
appropriate attention to protecting life, particularly of marginalized groups. Black Americans are 
more than twice as likely to be killed by police (Fagan and Campbell 2020). Those killed are also 
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more likely to be unarmed compared to White victims killed by police, suggesting that racial bias 
impacts officers’ decisions to use deadly force (Nix et al. 2017), though social scientists still 
debate that question (Fagan and Campbell 2020, footnote 34). What is clear from research on 
stop and frisk, traffic stops, SWAT team deployments, and arrests is that Black Americans come 
in contact more frequently with police, which cannot be explained by differences in crime rates 
(Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007; Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Mummolo 
2018a; Weaver, Papachristos, and Zanger-Tishler 2019). More intensive policing inflicts many 
harms on Black Americans (Alexander 2010; Butler 2017), including greater risk of death, since 
police interactions always carry some risk of escalating and turning deadly.  
Given racial disparities in law enforcement, bad police tactics pose avoidable risks to life 
that fall disproportionately on Black Americans. Because bad police tactics exacerbate the risks 
to Black lives, there are compelling racial justice grounds to take steps to end these tactics. And 
even if police enforced the law free from racial disparities, there still would be compelling reason 
to rein in bad tactics, since they undermine the protection of life. If the protection of Black and 
other lives is truly a priority, bad police tactics deserve our attention.  
 
The Problem of Police-Generated Killings 
Some killings by police are lawful and morally justified, like when deadly force is necessary to 
stop an unjust threat to life. Other killings by police violate the law and their ethical obligations, 
like shooting an unarmed fleeing suspect. Here the focus is on a third category: lawful but 
morally wrong killings. These killings involve police actions that, though legal, run afoul of our 
ethical intuitions. Such killings take life unnecessarily and violate the obligation to prioritize the 
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protection of life. They undermine police legitimacy, since those charged with upholding the law 
escape legal sanctions for blameworthy acts that harm others. 
What I call police-generated killings often fall into this category of lawful but morally 
wrong killings. As understood here, the term police-generated killing does not refer to just any 
killing where police play a causal role in the outcome. Rather, it refers to a narrower category: 
killings that result from bad tactics known to raise the risk of deadly force during a police 
interaction. Tactics that lead to police-generated killings deserve moral blame not because they 
fall short of perfection, but because they are obviously bad. By raising the risk of avoidable 
harm, such tactics are negligent or reckless. Those responsible for police-generated killings 
choose risky tactics despite having safer options to enforce the law.  
Police-generated killings come in two varieties. The first involves intentional deadly 
force:  
Police-Generated Killing Involving Intentional Deadly Force: A killing by police where 
bad tactics by the officer(s) involved create a situation where deadly force becomes 
necessary or perceived as necessary. 
 
This category excludes accidental killings that stem from morally justified tactics. If an officer 
engages in sound tactics when using deadly force necessary to stop an imminent threat to life, 
their action carries a small risk to bystanders and in rare cases may cause accidental death. 
Though the officer causes the death, bad tactics do not.3 My focus is instead on cases where bad 
tactics are to blame. In such cases, deadly force may appear justified if we just look at the 
moment it is used. But that perspective proves incomplete and misleading, for it fails to account 
for prior police actions that escalated force unnecessarily and created a situation requiring deadly 
force. Such poor tactical decisions violate police’s obligation to reduce the risk of deadly force.  
																																																								
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example. 
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  A police-generated killing involving intentional deadly force is the shooting of Tamir 
Rice. Only 12 years old, Rice was playing in a Cleveland park with a pellet gun when someone 
called 911, worried the gun might be real while noting it was “probably fake.” In the first of 
several errors, the dispatcher failed to tell officers the gun might be a toy. Officers Frank 
Garmback and Timothy Loehmann rushed to the scene, with Garmback driving and pulling their 
car directly in front of Rice. Loehmann jumped out and, perceiving a movement by Rice as a 
threat, shot him within two seconds of exiting the vehicle (Dewan and Oppel Jr. 2015).  
 Pulling the car so close to Rice was a tactical blunder criticized by experts of police 
force. Even if there were reasonable grounds to justify deadly force at the moment of the 
shooting, officers made critical mistakes beforehand, which created a situation where deadly 
force was perceived as necessary. When a potentially armed suspect is not an imminent threat, as 
in this case, best practices are for officers to maintain distance, talk to the suspect with the 
benefit of cover, and use de-escalation strategies to resolve the situation. Instead, officers pulled 
only a few feet from Rice, predictably increasing the risk of deadly force (Pickering and Klinger 
2016, 28). It likely was an avoidable killing caused by bad tactics.  
 Other police-generated killings involve officers using bad tactics that, though not 
intended to be deadly, have that effect. These incidents comprise a second category:   
Police-Generated Killing Involving Unintentional Deadly Force: A killing by police 
where bad tactics by the officer(s) involved have unintentional deadly effects. 
 
Not all police actions resulting in unintentional death qualify as a police-generated killing, as 
defined here. Sometimes officers exercise diligence and engage in best practices, yet by accident 
their actions prove fatal—such as striking and killing a pedestrian after a tire on a well-
maintained police cruiser blows. Police instead deserve blame for tactics known to increase the 
risk of deadly force and unnecessary to achieve the law enforcement objective at hand.  
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One of the most notorious examples of a police-generated killing involving unintentional 
deadly force is that of Eric Garner in 2014. Officers confronted Garner for allegedly selling 
untaxed cigarettes on the street in New York City. Video shows Garner’s resisting arrest, but 
without being violent. Officer Daniel Pantaleo used a chokehold to take down Garner, keeping 
his arm compressed around Garner’s neck for approximately 15 seconds. While restrained, 
Garner told officers “I can’t breathe” multiple times (Guardian 2014). Shortly after, Garner lost 
consciousness and was taken to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The medical 
examiner ruled the death a homicide, identifying the chokehold and pressure to Garner’s chest as 
causes of death (Goldstein and Santora 2014).  
 There is no evidence that Pantaleo intended to kill Garner, which would have been 
excessive given that Garner posed no imminent threat. But Pantaleo still erred in choosing a 
tactic less safe than other options and known to carry lethal risks. Despite no law at the time 
banning chokeholds, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) had a longstanding policy 
prohibiting the tactic: “members of the New York City Police Department will NOT use 
chokeholds. A chokehold shall include, but is not limited to, any pressure to the throat or 
windpipe, which may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air” (New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board 2014, 11). Pantaleo’s action clearly fits the NYPD’s definition 
of a chokehold, as video shows him applying pressure to Garner’s throat with his arms.  
The deaths of Rice and Garner highlight bad tactics associated with police-generated 
killings. Though not meant to be exhaustive, the following list identifies police tactics for which 
there is growing evidence that they unnecessarily endanger life. 
(1) Chokeholds and other neck restraints. Neck restraints are especially risky because 
they can restrict breathing or cut off blood to the brain with fatal consequences. Garner is one of 
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many victims to have died at the hands of police using such tactics. Because of their inherent 
dangers, chokeholds and other neck restraints should be treated as deadly force. Yet police 
continue to use these tactics in circumstances where deadly force is not justified (Matteis 2015). 
(2) Failure to use distance and cover. As the fatal shooting of Rice illustrates, when 
officers confront at close range a suspect believed to be armed and potentially dangerous but not 
an imminent threat, they make the encounter more dangerous for all involved. Maintaining 
distance and cover gives officers more time to react and helps keep nonlethal options available 
(Pickering and Klinger 2016, 28; Stoughton, Noble, and Alpert 2020, 167–74). 
(3) Rushing to confront a dangerous suspect alone. Research on killings by US police 
finds that unarmed suspects are more likely to be killed by an officer who is alone. That finding 
makes sense: a single officer is more vulnerable and more likely to have to rely on deadly force 
when responding to an actual or perceived threat. So it is unwise for an officer to rush to 
confront a suspect rather than wait for backup when the suspect, though dangerous, poses no 
immediate threat (Zimring 2017, 59–61; Stoughton, Noble, and Alpert 2020, 185). 
(4) No-knock warrants and raids. The 2020 killing of Breonna Taylor in Louisville, 
Kentucky, during the execution of a no-knock warrant highlights this tactic’s inherent dangers 
(Oppel Jr., Taylor, and Bogel-Burroughs 2021). No-knock warrants and raids began in the 1970s 
as part of the war on drugs and involve police forcibly entering a premise without knocking and 
announcing. Fearing a home intruder, some surprised residents respond with deadly force. No-
knock warrants and raids have resulted in many avoidable deaths to suspects, bystanders, and 
officers (Dolan 2019). 
(5) 21-Foot Rule. This rule developed in the 1980s advises officers to use deadly force 
against aggressors with an edged or blunt weapon who get within 21 feet. The 21-Foot Rule has 
	12 
come under criticism, especially since police in countries like the United Kingdom have 
developed effective nonlethal tactics to disarm aggressors with an edged or blunt weapon. 
Nonetheless, the tactic continues to be influential among US police (Zimring 2017, 100–2; 
Stoughton, Noble, and Alpert 2020, 168–71). 
 In sum, various bad tactics lead to police-generated killings. The next section looks at 
whether these avoidable killings and the bad tactics behind them merit legal sanctions.  
 
Accountability for Bad Tactics 
The most challenging police-generated killings to evaluate are those where, though bad tactics 
precede deadly force, such force is necessary to stop an unjust threat to life. When officers 
choose tactics that raise the risk of deadly force, their error does not justify any response by the 
suspect. Officers should use distance and cover when engaging armed suspects who are not 
imminent threats. But if officers instead confront a suspect at close distance, command them to 
drop their weapon, and the suspect responds by threatening deadly force, officers face an unjust 
threat to life. Officers who don’t use deadly force in this scenario jeopardize their lives and 
possibly others’ too. In these cases, it may seem unfair to sanction officers. If we can show that 
legal sanctions are appropriate even in these cases, it is safe to conclude that they also are 
appropriate for other police-generated killings where the exculpatory factors are weaker.   
Potential insights for this task come from ethical and legal thinking on self-generated 
self-defense, where the person who engages in self-defense started the trouble (Leverick 2006, 
109–29). Here is an example: 
The Bar Fight: While at a bar, Sam provokes Hank by punching him once in the jaw. 
Hank responds disproportionately by pulling a knife. Faced with an imminent threat to 
his life, Sam shoots and kills Hank. Though Sam ends the fight with intentional deadly 
force, he did not intend to kill Hank at the start of the fight. 
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Sam intentionally uses deadly force only after Hank makes an imminent and unjust threat against 
his life. Normally, that threat would justify deadly force, but Sam’s initial assault puts his self-
defense claim in doubt. After all, if Sam never punched Hank, he likely would have never ended 
up in a situation requiring deadly force. Similarly, in police-generated killings, deadly force 
likely would not have occurred if officers had avoided tactics that unnecessarily escalated force.  
Some may object to the analogy between self-generated self-defense and police-
generated killings on the following grounds: police often respond to disturbances caused by 
others rather than start the trouble, like Sam does in the bar fight. But even if someone else starts 
the trouble, an officer intervening still has an obligation to choose tactics that reduce the risk of 
deadly force (assuming deadly force is unnecessary). When an officer violates that obligation 
and causes a police-generated killing, they are morally blameworthy in much the same way Sam 
is. Both the officer and Sam escalate force unnecessarily and play a causal role in the resulting 
death.    
Cases of self-generated self-defense, like the bar fight, raise thorny questions about 
culpability (Robinson 1985; Leverick 2006, 109–29; Sangero 2006, 310–39). Broadly speaking, 
there are three different ways to treat this case: 
(1) Not justified self-defense: initial aggressor is fully liable for victim’s death since they 
provoked the conditions that made deadly force necessary (Sam is guilty of murder) 
 
(2) Justified self-defense: initial aggressor is only liable for the unlawful provocation 
considered in isolation (Sam is guilty of assault) 
 
(3) Imperfect self-defense: initial aggressor is partially liable for victim’s death due to 
deadly force being necessary but also a result of their own provocation (Sam is guilty 
of manslaughter) 
 
None of these approaches enjoys a clear consensus, which is evident in law (Robinson 
1985). The rationale behind (1) is straightforward: a common criterion for justified self-defense 
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is that the person making the claim did not provoke the difficulty requiring force, and failing to 
meet that criterion precludes a claim to self-defense (e.g., State v. Moore 1975, 276). Arizona’s 
statute on self-defense reflects this approach. It only allows an initial aggressor to regain a self-
defense justification by withdrawing or communicating their desire to end the conflict (Arizona 
State Legislature 2020). Other states like Iowa opt for (2). Its statute treats deadly force by an 
initial aggressor as justified when in response to force “grossly disproportionate to the 
provocation,” which they reasonably believe places them in “imminent danger of death or 
serious injury.” In line with the Model Penal Code, Iowa’s statute denies a self-defense 
justification to those who provoke an attack with the intention of having an excuse to kill, but 
potentially allows it to those who provoke an attack without murderous intent (Iowa Legislature 
2021; Dubber 2015, 164–65). Option (3), imperfect self-defense, emerged as a compromise 
position in the common law (Moreland 1952, 87–92). The Supreme Court of North Carolina and 
other courts recognize this doctrine and the penalty for manslaughter as appropriate for deadly 
force by someone who provoked the conditions that made it necessary (State v. Bush 1982, 159).  
The goal here is not to resolve longstanding debates over whether (1), (2), or (3) is 
correct. But from these approaches we can draw two important conclusions for police-generated 
killings. First, the most lenient option still outlines sanctions for self-generated self-defense. 
Most readily recognize that Sam commits a blameworthy act and deserves some sanction for 
starting the fight leading to Hank’s death. Likewise, police-generated killings involve a clear 
wrong: failing to prioritize the protection of life by choosing tactics that unnecessarily raise the 
risk of deadly force. In this way, police violate an ethical obligation tied to their profession. Now 
not all ethical violations merit legal sanctions, which in many cases would fail to advance a 
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legitimate state interest. But for police-generated killings, the state’s interest in protecting life 
gives it compelling reason to sanction ethical violations that cause such killings. 
Second, penalties for self-generated self-defense apply to civilians who often lack any 
training in use of force or de-escalation. Such laws communicate the normative expectation that 
all should avoid actions that unnecessarily risk precipitating deadly force. That expectation 
should be even stronger for professionals trained in use of force and de-escalation. For this 
reason, democratic institutions have strong reason to prohibit bad tactics and impose meaningful 
penalties on officers who use them—especially when they cause an avoidable death. 
Some may object to individual sanctions in these cases on the grounds that police-
generated killings stem from system failures, not just errors by particular officers. When such 
killings occur, various factors typically are to blame—such as breakdowns in communication, 
inadequate training, and institutional pressures—similar to how plane crashes stem from multiple 
errors (Sherman 2018). This objection makes a critical point, but can err in minimizing officers’ 
role. For instance, Lawrence Sherman (2018, 439) identifies various factors leading to Tamir 
Rice’s death—miscommunication by the 911 dispatcher, the Cleveland Division of Police’s not 
contacting departments where candidates previously worked when hiring, and the pellet gun’s 
missing the standard orange mark to indicate it’s a toy. Those observations are all true, but 
Lawrence omits a crucial point. Even with all those factors, Rice likely would still be alive if 
officers at the scene chose better tactics.4 Many factors can contribute to an outcome without 
eliminating the moral responsibility of individual actors (see Miller 2016, 138–57). 
It is important to pair greater accountability for individual officers with additional 
measures. Many police-generated killings result from bad tactics in line with departmental 
																																																								
4 Though systemic failures plagued the Cleveland Division of Police (US Department of Justice 2014), officers 
should have known not to pull their cruiser so close to Rice, which violated a departmental rule (Calamur 2017). 
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training and policies, which highlights the need for systemic change. In a well-functioning 
system, there are rules on bad police tactics to avoid, regular training on alternative tactics that 
reduce the risk of deadly force, resources to employ those alternatives, and incentives to 
encourage their use. These institutional features aim to reduce police-generated killings and 
come with higher expectations for officers. Notably, mechanisms of accountability for individual 
officers help contribute to systemic change, since they create incentives for police administrators 
to implement training and policy aimed at avoiding tactics that prompt legal sanctions. 
As to how to hold officers accountable, the law offers several options: (1) criminal 
penalties, (2) decertification, and (3) civil damages. All have a role with their own strengths and 
weaknesses. In response to high-profile killings by police involving bad tactics, the focus often is 
on (1) for understandable reason. Of the three sanctions, criminal penalties represent the most 
severe option and communicate most directly the gravity of the offense.  
Though criminal penalties are important, it would be a mistake to solely rely on them to 
ensure accountability. One reason why is the high bar that must be met to impose criminal 
penalties. Criminal law is set up to err on the side of not convicting the guilty rather than 
convicting the innocent, and this principle applies across the board—including to officers whose 
bad tactics jeopardize life. Even in a fair and well-functioning criminal justice system, its high 
burden of proof would leave advocates of police accountability frustrated on occasion.  
For this reason, there is value in pairing criminal penalties with other sanctions that 
require a lower burden of proof and can provide a meaningful floor of accountability for police-
generated killings. Police decertification, which revokes an officer’s law enforcement license, is 
the most natural option to serve that function. Officers responsible for police-generated killings 
commit a grave violation of their professional obligations, and license revocation imposes a 
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severe professional penalty in response. In contrast to just firing an officer, this sanction prevents 
them from serving in law enforcement elsewhere.5 And since administrative law frequently relies 
on a lower standard of proof than criminal law—like preponderance of the evidence—it faces 
less formidable hurdles for ensuring accountability (Goldman 2003, 139).  
Admittedly, lowering the burden of proof raises the risk of imposing sanctions on officers 
who were justified in using deadly force. Such increased risk is intolerable in the criminal 
context, where mistaken sanctions imprison the innocent, but is less problematic in the context of 
license revocation. In contrast to criminal penalties, mistakenly revoking a license—though 
regrettable—does not deprive an officer of a basic right like their liberty. Such mistakes are 
justified if an unavoidable part of an overall system that improves police accountability and 
conducts reliably accurate (but not foolproof) investigations of alleged misconduct.  
 In addition, professional penalties for police-generated killings can have indirect effects 
that improve accountability in the criminal system. If administrative law bans specific tactics, it 
becomes easier to show that officers should have known to avoid such tactics. Professional 
penalties thus are relevant for criminal convictions that require showing an officer acted 
recklessly or negligently (e.g., manslaughter). 
 Like police decertification, civil suits against officers require a lower burden of proof 
than what criminal law requires. When courts award civil damages to victims of police 
misconduct, local governments pay these damages (Schwartz 2014). In this way, civil suits hold 
democratic institutions accountable for failures in their role as oversight bodies of the police. 
Such suits also serve an important function that criminal penalties and decertification do not—
providing restitution to those harmed most directly by bad police tactics. 
																																																								
5 Because decertification laws are often weak today, it is not uncommon for fired officers to find employment in 
other law enforcement agencies (Grunwald and Rappaport 2020).  
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 The sanctions of criminal penalties, decertification, and civil damages together have the 
potential to provide meaningful accountability for bad police tactics. Current law, however, falls 
woefully short of ensuring such accountability, as the next section explains.  
 
Where the Law Falls Short 
This article opened by discussing the fatal shooting of Walter Scott, an unarmed fleeing suspect 
who presented no immediate danger. Deadly police force in those circumstances violates the law 
and can result in the sanctions listed above: criminal penalties, decertification, and civil damages. 
But that was not always true. If the shooting occurred in the 1970s, in many jurisdictions it 
would have been “lawful but awful.” The category of lawful but awful police force can shift, 
which reminds us that current failures to sanction bad tactics are far from inevitable.  
 Tennessee v. Garner (1985) illustrates this point. Here the Supreme Court intervened and 
had perhaps its greatest success in restricting excessive police force. Garner prohibits police 
from shooting fleeing suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to 
others, and deems such force an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Before the decision, numerous police departments had already scrapped the fleeing felon rule, 
which allowed officers to use deadly force to prevent the escape of fleeing felony suspects, 
regardless of whether they were dangerous. Killings by police decreased without increases in 
officer deaths, as more departments banned deadly force against nondangerous fleeing suspects 
(Sherman 2018, 425–28). These findings contributed to a growing consensus that the fleeing 
felon rule was inconsistent with best practices and unnecessary to enforce the law. The court 
cited this shift as a reason for its ruling (Tennessee v. Garner 1985, 10–11, 18–19). What 
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resulted was a specific rule to guide police on when they could use deadly force, and evidence 
suggests that the ruling further helped reduce killings by police (Tennenbaum 1994).  
 The effectiveness of Garner lies in providing concrete guidance for police to avoid a 
specific bad tactic. But the same reason for why Garner is effective—its specificity—also limits 
it as a panacea for bad tactics. Many police tactics beyond what Garner addresses also endanger 
life unnecessarily. Before deciding whether to shoot, police make various tactical decisions that 
can have lethal consequences, and for those decisions Garner offers limited guidance. 
In Graham v. Connor (1989), the Supreme Court put forth a more general rule for 
evaluating police force. According to Graham’s “objective reasonableness” standard, what 
matters in determining the constitutionality of police force is not officers’ intentions, but whether 
the force in question would be justified from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same 
situation. This principle has the virtue of offering guidance for a broader range of action than 
Garner does. Yet that apparent advantage comes with a downside: Graham offers a principle 
whose guidance is far less clear. How exactly a “reasonable” officer would act has sparked 
disagreement since Graham (Alpert and Smith 1994; Harmon 2008). That is especially true in 
the decentralized context of US policing, which consists of nearly 18,000 different law 
enforcement agencies that lack uniform policies and training (Reaves 2011, 2). 
 Language from Graham further adds to the confusion over how to apply its objective 
reasonableness standard. An oft-quoted passage from Graham reads:  
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of 
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight…. The 
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, 
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation. (Graham v. Connor 1989, 396–97) 
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Notably, this passage echoes language from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Tennessee 
v. Garner (1985, 23) and has become a common justification by the court for bad police 
tactics—a development that complicates Garner’s legacy (Obasogie and Newman 2018, 1476). 
By incorporating concerns from O’Connor’s earlier dissent, Graham signaled the court’s 
reluctance to second-guess tactical decisions by police. Certainly, any evaluation of police force 
must consider the stress and uncertainty experienced by officers at the time. The problem with 
Graham, however, is that its emphasis on split-second decisions in police work can discourage 
analysis of deliberate tactical planning that often comes prior.6  
Lower courts have split on how to apply Graham, with some considering prior tactics 
when evaluating the reasonableness of police force and others restricting their focus to the final 
frame when force is used (Noble and Alpert 2010, 486–87). Courts also have been inconsistent 
in incorporating the latest understandings of best police practices into their analyses of 
reasonable action (Garrett and Stoughton 2017). Despite such confusion, the Supreme Court has 
doubled down on Graham’s approach of eschewing specific rules against bad tactics. That is 
evident in Scott v. Harris (2007), which deemed it constitutional for police to terminate a high-
speed chase in response to a minor traffic violation by ramming the suspect’s car—an action that 
left the suspect paralyzed. The ruling explicitly rejected attempts to formulate “an easy-to-apply 
legal test” to evaluate specific police tactics (Scott v. Harris 2007, 383). 
The Supreme Court’s embrace of the doctrine of qualified immunity exacerbates the 
failures of constitutional law to rein in bad police tactics. This doctrine says that police officers 
and other government officials are protected from civil damages for constitutional rights 
																																																								
6 As Obasogie and Newman (2018) point out, Graham also stymied efforts to challenge racial disparities in police 
force by identifying the Fourth Amendment as the relevant constitutional provision for evaluating such force, thus 




violations unless “clearly established” law prohibited their actions. Pearson v. Callahan (2009) 
even allows courts to skip their analysis of whether an officer’s actions violated another’s 
constitutional rights and go straight to deciding whether the officer broke clearly established law. 
That wrinkle stunts the law’s development. When there is no analysis of whether police tactics 
violated someone’s rights, a plaintiff lacks an avenue to establish that unconstitutional actions 
are in fact unconstitutional, and bad tactics continue without sanctions (Schwartz 2017, 65–66). 
So despite Garner’s success in prohibiting a bad tactic and reducing police killings, the 
Supreme Court has resisted that approach in other cases. When confronted with many of the bad 
police tactics discussed above, the court has avoided taking action to ban them. In City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons (1983), the court sidestepped the question of whether chokeholds were 
unconstitutional, allowing them to remain police practice throughout many parts of the country. 
In Richards v. Wisconsin (1997), the court recognized the constitutionality of no-knock raids by 
police. And in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015), the court granted qualified 
immunity to officers who shot a woman with mental illness holding a knife in an encounter 
precipitated by poor tactics. These and other cases suggest a troubling conclusion: instead of 
serving as a bulwark against bad tactics, constitutional law too often empowers police to use 
them—especially against the most vulnerable and marginalized (Butler 2016).  
There are, of course, tools beyond constitutional law to promote accountability for bad 
police tactics. Constitutional law sets minimum standards that police nationwide must uphold, 
and states can go beyond those requirements by prohibiting additional tactics that unnecessarily 
endanger life. Many states, though, fail to pursue this option. In fact, an analysis of state criminal 
statutes on police deadly force finds that many outline standards less restrictive than what 
Garner requires (Stoughton, Noble, and Alpert 2020, 81–86). Such statutes, often enacted before 
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Garner, represent more than just dead laws superseded by federal rulings. They continue to have 
pernicious effects by entrenching outdated standards into police policy (e.g., Pittsburgh Bureau 
of Police 2021, 3) and limiting the ability of prosecutors to obtain convictions of officers 
responsible for avoidable killings (e.g., Palmer 2019). In addition to these deficiencies in 
criminal law, state administrative law remains underdeveloped as a tool for revoking the licenses 
of officers who engage in bad tactics (Goldman 2016).  
All these factors hinder meaningful accountability for police-generated killings. Consider 
the shooting of Tamir Rice. In this case, the prosecutor argued against criminal charges and 
commissioned two reports that drew heavily on Graham to claim that the officer’s deadly force 
was objectively reasonable (Crawford 2015; Sims 2015). The grand jury then followed the 
prosecutor’s recommendation to not charge the officers (Williams and Smith 2015). Having 
escaped legal sanctions, the officer who made the critical error of driving immediately in front of 
Rice received only a five-day suspension (Associated Press 2018a). The officer who shot Rice 
was fired, but for a reason unrelated to the shooting—providing false information on his job 
application (Calamur 2017). Since his license was not revoked, another department was able to 
hire him (Associated Press 2018b). Without clear case law or statutes prohibiting the tactics that 
led to Rice’s death, accountability proved elusive.  
One way to ensure greater police accountability is for legislators at the local, state, and 
federal level to take a more aggressive approach to outlining and prohibiting in law specific bad 
tactics. Some may question this approach on the grounds that any list of bad tactics will prove 
incomplete and require revision in light of new research. Certainly, the law will require updates 
as new evidence builds that specific tactics raise the risk of deadly force unnecessarily. But such 
work is the inevitable price that comes with meaningful police oversight in a democratic society.  
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This approach offers distinct advantages to excessive reliance on something more general 
like Graham’s objective reasonableness standard, which fails to provide officers concrete 
guidance. As Egon Bittner (1970, 38) notes, it “smacks of … perversity” to empower police to 
use force without clear guidelines. Rules prohibiting specific bad tactics can save lives, evident 
from the reduction in police killings after the ban on deadly force against nondangerous fleeing 
felons.  
 
The Case and Tools for Reform 
Despite the dangers of police-generated killings, some still may see them as rare events that 
don’t merit significant attention. There are several reasons to reject this skepticism. First, police-
generated killings may occur more often than many assume. Each year in the US police kill 
hundreds of suspects who have a weapon less lethal than a firearm, like a knife or club, or no 
weapon at all (Washington Post 2021). Policing in other countries suggests that many of these 
killings can be avoided. In the UK, police kill individuals at a far lower rate. That is partly due to 
fewer handguns in the population, but police tactics also play a role. Since many officers do not 
carry firearms, UK police have had to develop nonlethal tactics to disarm suspects without 
firearms, such as repositioning, use of protective shields, and not rushing to resolve incidents 
(Police Executive Research Forum 2016, 88–105). These tactics do not appear to sacrifice officer 
safety, given the low numbers of police in the UK who are killed (Zimring 2017, 88).  
 Second, regardless of their frequency, police-generated killings can have outsized effects. 
Not every killing by police has the same impact. Killings involving questionable force are more 
likely to generate protests, erode trust in and cooperation with police, and hinder public safety. 
Indeed, public trust in the police tends to drop after high-profile incidents of questionable police 
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force, especially among groups most directly impacted (Weitzer 2002). After the killings of 
Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and other Black lives in 2020, a Gallup poll found that only 19% 
of Black Americans had confidence in the police (Jones 2020). The frequent lack of 
accountability in response to police-generated killings only compounds this distrust and 
undermines the legitimacy of government institutions more broadly.  
 So there are compelling reasons to pursue reforms tackling the problem of police-
generated killings. If successful, such reforms can save lives and foster greater trust between 
police and communities. Democratic institutions have several tools to advance those goals. 
 (1) Criminal statutes on police deadly force that prioritize the protection of life. In the 
fight against bad tactics, some emphasize that police administrators should lead through reforms 
to departmental policy (Zimring 2017, 219–38). That strategy is worth pursuing—police 
administrators should do everything in their power to prevent unnecessary killings. But the 
reality is that, without the intervention of lawmakers, many agencies never adopt reforms 
(Gilbert 2017). Criminal law serves as a tool for implementing stronger and more uniform 
sanctions for bad tactics. Currently, state statutes permit police deadly force across a range of 
circumstances where it is unnecessary to protect life against an imminent threat. Many statutes 
also fail to prohibit egregious tactics like chokeholds. Such broad permissions show up in police 
policies, training, and practice, as well as create obstacles for obtaining convictions after police-
generated killings. Recently, a few states have taken steps to address these problems through 
enacting criminal statutes that narrow the justification for police deadly force and ban 
chokeholds (Chabria 2019; Ferré-Sadurní and McKinley 2020). More states should do the same.    
(2) License revocation for officers who engage in bad tactics. State administrative law 
has the potential to define and ban bad police tactics that unnecessarily risk life, as well as 
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impose meaningful sanctions for their use. Though some states list unjustified deadly force as a 
reason for license revocation (Goldman 2012, 152), they need to go further and specify bad 
tactics that would result in loss of license, especially for repeated violations or violations that 
result in police-generated killings. To provide a meaningful floor of accountability even when 
other mechanisms fail, states should be able to pursue decertification independently of whether 
an officer is criminally convicted or terminated following arbitration guaranteed by a union 
contract (Goldman 2012, 150–51; Rushin 2019, 586–87). These reforms would incentivize Peace 
Officer Standards and Training (POST) commissions—which in most states have authority over 
police training requirements and revoking licenses (Goldman 2003, 122)—to train officers to 
avoid bad tactics banned by law. States also can pass laws detailing training requirements.  
(3) Requirements that a portion of patrol officers not carry a firearm. In the UK, most 
officers do not carry a gun and kill at far lower rates than in the US. Not surprisingly, compared 
to the US, UK police have shown greater urgency in adopting nonlethal tactics that can help 
resolve encounters with suspects who are unarmed or have a weapon less lethal than a firearm. 
Such tactics are critical for officer safety when they cannot rely on a gun as a crutch to make up 
for bad tactics. Though advocated by some (Vitale 2017, 25–27), removing guns from US 
officers has remained a fringe proposal due to worries that it would endanger officers given the 
higher number of guns in the US population. But even if a higher proportion of US officers need 
to carry firearms compared to their UK counterparts, steps can be taken to remove guns from 
officers on less dangerous patrols. For these officers, it would be imperative to learn nonlethal 
tactics when encountering aggressors with weapons less lethal than a firearm, which could help 
spur training in tactics currently neglected in the US. Local governments and universities can 
advance this goal by requiring a portion of their department’s officers to not carry guns. 
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(4) Enhanced constitutional protections against bad tactics. In Garner, the Supreme 
Court banned a bad tactic by ending the blanket permission for police to shoot fleeing felons. 
This intervention came after numerous states and law enforcement agencies had abandoned the 
fleeing felon rule. Looking forward, if more states and law enforcement agencies abandon other 
tactics that unnecessarily threaten life, future litigation can make the case that these tactics no 
longer are reasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment. This long-term strategy can bolster 
protections against bad police tactics and ensure that they apply nationally (see Garrett and 
Stoughton 2017). In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity hinders courts from recognizing 
constitutional violations caused by bad tactics. Congress has the power to end this judicial 
invention, a step that recently has gained support (Sonmez, Kane, and Colvin 2020).   
Together, these recommendations call for higher police standards. They place additional 
restrictions on what tactics officers can use and thus will meet opposition from some police 
organizations. When the Police Executive Research Forum called on police to voluntarily 
implement tactics to reduce the risk of deadly force, both the Fraternal Order of Police and 
International Association of Chiefs of Police denounced the idea (Jackman 2016). The above 
reforms go further than ones already rejected by some of the most powerful police organizations. 
 Despite formidable challenges facing reform efforts, history does offer reason for hope. 
Some of the same organizations resisting reforms today also opposed ending the fleeing felon 
rule. Before Garner, the membership of the International Association of Chiefs of Police passed 
a resolution supporting the fleeing felon rule by a four-to-one margin (Kleinig 1996, 114). In this 
case, dire warnings that ending the rule would increase crime and endanger officers proved 
unfounded. A combination of research, voluntary police reform, state legislation, and Supreme 
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Court intervention ended the fleeing felon rule and saved lives. Similar reforms at all levels are 
now needed to address police-generated killings and the moral hazards they pose.  
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